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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 
1996): "appeals from the district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not 
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, 
and paternity." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion, thereby violating appellants' Laura Fluhman, 
Paige Parsons, and Sidney Laken Fluhman (Fluhmans) due process rights, by failing to 
provide them with timely notice that adequately informed the Fluhmans regarding the issues 
to be heard at trial, when the trial was expanded beyond the scope of appellee's, Timothy 
D. Sanchez (Sanchez), complaint for fraudulent adoption to include a trial on the issue of 
compliance with the Utah Adoption Statute? 
Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in concluding that appellant Paige Parsons' 
(Parsons) finalized adoption of Sidney was not perfected as pertaining to Sanchez? 
Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in concluding that placement for adoption 
does not occur until an action for adoption has been filed in the appropriate venue? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented herein are questions of law and statutory interpretation. Utah 
appellate courts have consistently held that questions of law, including adoption law, are 
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reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's conclusions. Matter of 
Adoption of W., 904 P.2d 1113,1116 (Utah App. 1995), State in Interest of H.J., 986 P.2d 
115,120 (Utah App. 1999), State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah App. 1995). 
AUTHORITIES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Fluhmans submit that the precedents of State in the Interest of H.J., 986 P.2d 115 
(Utah App. 1999) and State Ex Rel. M.W. 970 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1998) are of central 
importance in disposing of the due process (lack of notice) claim presented herein. 
Fluhmans also refer the court to In Re Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 
1999), and Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 as having bearing on the issue presented herein 
concerning perfection of Sidney's adoption as against Sanchez. The Utah adoption code, 
CA §§78-30-1 et seq. (1996) is also applicable, particularly sections 4.12-4.16. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding was commenced in the Second Judicial District Court for the State 
of Utah. Sanchez's complaint only alleged that Parsons' adoption of Sidney was fraudulent 
and that it was pursued for the purpose of depriving Sanchez of his parental rights. The 
Honorable Thomas L. Kay found that Parsons' adoption of Sidney, in probate number 
982700016AD, was not perfected as to Sanchez. Judge Kay held that "Placement" means 
having non-custodial parties on notice that an adoption is proceeding and concluded that 
Sidney was "placed for adoption" within the meaning of the law after she was at least six 
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(6) months old. In reaching this conclusion the trial court held that Sidney was "placed for 
adoption" when Parsons' petition for adoption was transferred to the Second District court 
in case number 982700016. 
This case is an appeal of the trial court's final decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Laura Fluhman (Laura), is the adult natural daughter of Paige Parsons 
(Parsons). Sidney Laken Fluhman (Sidney), a minor, is Laura's natural daughter. Sidney 
was born on March 26, 1997. On February 9, 1998, in the Utah Second District Court, 
probate number 982700016, Parsons adopted Sidney and the adoption became final on that 
date. The adoption gave Parsons the sole custody of Sidney. All three appellants, Laura, 
Parsons and Sidney live together in Parsons home. Laura has diabetes and other health 
problems that currently prevent her from working. 
In 1996, Laura and Sanchez were involved in a sexual relationship. During the 
course of the relationship between Sanchez and Laura, she became pregnant. At all times 
during the pregnancy and at least until Sidney's birth, Sanchez was married, to someone 
(not Laura). It is uncontested that Sidney was Sanchez's natural daughter. 
At the time of Sidney's birth, Laura and Sanchez were drifting apart. They did not 
intend, nor where they going to marry. In fact, on the weekend after Sidney's birth Sanchez 
went on vacation with his wife. 
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Prior to Sidney's birth, Sanchez and Laura discussed the baby's future. They 
discussed whether the child would have Sanchez's surname on the birth certificate. Prior 
to Sidney's birth, Laura informed Sanchez that he would not be listed as the father on the 
baby's birth certificate and that the baby would not be given the Sanchez surname. 
Laura and Sanchez also discussed insurance issues regarding the baby. Prior to 
Sidney's birth, Sanchez offered to put the baby on the health insurance he carried through 
his employment. However, Laura refused this offer. 
Laura's pregnancy with Sidney was considered high risk due to problems associated 
with diabetes and high blood pressure. Both parties knew, despite the baby, they would not 
be together after Sidney was bom. In order to avoid any stressful confrontations with 
Sanchez, Laura registered under an assumed name when she checked into the hospital to 
deliver Sidney. Sidney's birth was also registered on hospital records under an assumed 
name. 
Sidney was born three weeks premature and kept in the neonatal intensive care unit 
(NICU) at the University of Utah Medical Center (Hospital). As consequence of her 
premature birth, Sidney remained at the Hospital NICU for a period of time after Laura was 
released to go home. Sidney was bora on a Wednesday. The following Sunday, after her 
release from the Hospital, Laura contacted Sanchez and talked to him about Sidney's birth. 
Sanchez had previously been informed about Sidney's birth by his wife. 
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Previous to the above-referenced conversation with Laura, Sanchez attempted to visit 
the child at the Hospital. However, because Sidney was on Hospital records under an 
assumed name, the staff refused him the right to visit with the baby. After Sanchez and 
Laura talked on the Sunday subsequent to Sidney's birth, Laura arranged for Sanchez to 
have visitation with the baby while Sidney was still at the Hospital. After Sidney's release 
from the Hospital in April 1997, Sanchez continued to visit Sidney at the Fluhmans' home. 
On average, Sanchez visited Sidney at the Fluhman's home twice a month from April 1997 
until August 1998. 
Subsequent to Sidney' s birth, Sanchez began making child support payments to Laura 
in the approximate amount of $165 per month, commencing April 1997 and continuing 
thereafter until December 1997. In December 1997 Sanchez increased his child support 
payments by approximately $ 10.00. Sanchez made child support payments of approximately 
$ 175 in December 1997 and in January 1998. The Flumans did not ask or demand, formally 
or informally, that Sanchez pay child support for Sidney. At all times, Sanchez unilaterally 
determined the amount of child support he paid and voluntarily made the payments. 
In April 1997 with Laura's consent, Parsons retained an attorney, Keith Eddington, 
to arrange for the adoption of Sidney by Parsons. On April 21,1997 when Sidney was less 
than one month old, Mr. Eddington filed a petition for the adoption of Sidney by Parsons. 
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The petition for adoption filed on Parsons' behalf included a consent to adopt signed by 
Laura. As a result of a misunderstanding by Mr. Eddington, he filed the adoption petition 
in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, case no. 972900190 AD instead of the Second 
District Court, Davis County, where Parsons and Sidney resided. 
On January 12,1998 Mr. Eddington filed a Motion for Change of Venue with regard 
to Parsons' petition for the adoption of Sidney. The motion was granted and the adoption 
case was transferred to the Utah Second District, Davis County. Parsons' petition for 
adoption was granted by the Second District Court, Davis County, State of Utah and a 
Decree of Adoption was entered on case no. 98270016 in February 1998 as previously 
noted. Sanchez was not notified that Parsons was adopting Sidney before the Decree of 
Adoption was entered. At the time the adoption was finalized, Sidney was under 11 months 
old. 
In February 1998 Sanchez was informed that Parsons had adopted Sidney. In 
February 1998 Parsons and Laura also refused to accept any additional child support 
payments from Sanchez. However, Parsons continued to permit visitation between Sanchez 
and Sidney. During Sanchez's visitation with Sidney at Parsons' home in July 1998, 
Sanchez requested the right to have visitation with Sidney away from the Parsons' residence. 
Neither Parsons or Laura would permit Sanchez the additional visitation he requested and 
Sanchez was told he would not longer be permitted to visit Sidney at Parsons' home. 
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In September 1998 Sanchez caused a complaint to be filed against the Fluhmans in 
the Utah Second District Court, Davis County, through his attorney, Randy S. Ludlow. The 
complaint alleged four causes of action. The first cause of action alleged that Sidney was 
a minor and as such should have appointed on her behalf a Guardian Ad Litem. 
Sanchez's second cause of action alleged that Parsons' adoption of Sidney was 
fraudulent, demanded that the adoption be set aside, that Sanchez be deemed Sidney's 
natural father, that he be given parental rights, and that Sidney be given his surname. 
Sanchez's third cause of action alleged that Parsons' adoption of Sidney was 
fraudulent, and demanded monetary damages resulting from the fraud in a sum not less than 
$500,000. 
Sanchez's fourth cause of action alleged fraudulent inducement, i.e., that Laura made 
fraudulent statements to Sanchez which Sanchez believed and relied on. The fourth cause 
of action demanded general, special, punitive, and exemplary damages against Laura and 
Parsons in an amount not less than $500,000. 
At no time before or after the birth of Sidney and prior to filing his complaint against 
the Fluhmans did Sanchez file an "Acknowledgment of Paternity" as to Sidney. 
A bench trial was held on Sanchez's complaint on April 27, 2000 in the Utah Second 
District Court, Davis County, Judge Thomas L. Kay presiding. Fluhman's were present and 
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represented by counsel, Keith Eddington. Sanchez was present and represented by counsel, 
Randy Ludlow. 
At trial the Fluhmans' attorney prepared for and was ready to defend against 
Sanchez's complaint for fraudulent adoption. However, at trial, over Fluhmans9 objections 
and with the consent of Sanchez, the court did not reach a decision based on Sanchez's 
claim of fraudulent adoption. Effectively, but not specifically, the court allowed Sanchez 
to amend his complaint, present evidence, and seek relief based on allegations that in 
adopting Sidney, Parsons' failed to comply with Utah adoption law. 
The trial court found that Sidney was placed for adoption after she was at least six 
months old. The court found that placement occurred when the Parsons' petition was 
transferred to the Utah Second District Court, Davis County. Accordingly, the court found 
and awarded judgment to Sanchez on the sole basis that Parsons' adoption of Sidney was 
not perfected as to Sanchez because Parsons failed to comply with the requirements of Utah 
adoption law. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By effectively allowing Sanchez to amend his complaint at trial and seek relief based 
on allegations that Parsons' adoption of Sidney failed to comply with Utah adoption law, the 
court violated Fluhmans' due process rights to notice regarding the adjudicated at trial. 
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Under Utah's adoption statutes and applicable case law, the trial court erred in 
defining placement to mean when Parsons' Petition for Adoption was filed in the proper 
venue. 
As a matter of law, under U.C.A. §§78-30-4.12-4.16, the trial court erred in setting 
aside the final adoption decree entered on Sidney's adoption by Parsons. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION BASED ON ITS FAILURE TO PROTECT THE 
FLUHMANS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO NOTICE. 
Utah appellate courts have consistently held "due process requires timely notice 
which adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet." State 
Ex Rel. M.W., 970 P.2d 284,294 (Utah App. 1998). State In Interest of H.J., 986 P.2d 115, 
126 (Utah App. 1999) reaffirmed due process notice requirements. H.J. involved an appeal 
by the grandmother of three children from the dismissal of her adoption petition in juvenile 
court. 
The grandmother filed a motion in juvenile court for temporary custody of the 
children. This motion was filed and heard before the natural mother's parental rights were 
terminated. After an evidentiary hearing, the grandmother's motion for temporary custody 
was denied. 
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Subsequently, the state filed a motion to terminate the natural mother's parental 
rights. Prior to a hearing on the state's termination of parental rights motion, the 
grandmother filed an adoption petition. After a hearing resulting in termination of the 
natural mother's parental rights, the state filed a motion to dismiss the grandmother's 
adoption petition. Without an evidentiary hearing, the state's motion to dismiss the adoption 
petition was granted. The juvenile court found that the evidentiary hearing on the 
grandmother's motion for temporary custody settled all of the custody matters as pertaining 
to the grandmother. 
On appeal, this court reversed the juvenile court's dismissal of the adoption petition 
and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the grandmother's 
petition. Id. at 127. The court concluded that the grandmother had no notice that a single 
evidentiary hearing for the purpose resolving a specific motion, would also resolve other 
issues including the question of fitness for adoption. Id. at 126. 
In H.J. the court noted that for purposes of judicial economy, the juvenile court had 
apparently attempted to adapt a hearing held for one specific purpose to another. However, 
the court quoted approvingly from its decision in A.E. v Christean, 938 P.2d 811,816 (Utah 
App. 1997) affirming its position that "Judicial economy cannot justify the double use of 
hearings when the purpose behind the hearings involves different issues of fact and law. 
H.J. id. at 125. 
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Similarly, in the case now before this court, Sanchez filed a complaint against the 
Fluhmans alleging fraud and fraudulent inducement. Nowhere in the complaint or any 
amendments, did Sanchez state a claim for relief based on failure to comply with Utah 
adoption law. In fact, it is arguable that Sanchez purposefully avoided bringing his cause 
of action under Utah adoption law because U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(2) specifically provides that 
fraudulent representations cannot be a basis for vacation of an adoption decree. 
U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(2) provides: Any person injured by fraudulent representations 
or actions in connection with an adoption is entitled to pursue civil or criminal penalties in 
accordance with existing law. A fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict 
compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and is not a basis for dismissal of a 
petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption decree or an automatic grant of custody to the 
offended party.... Based on this statute, the Fluhmans moved the trial court to dismiss 
Sanchez's complaint. However at a hearing on February 11, 1999 the court denied 
Fluhmans' motion, stating its preference to hear Sanchez's evidence at trial and render a 
decision based on the facts of the case. 
It is essential to note, at the hearing on Fluhmans' motion to dismiss, the parties and 
the court discussed the effect of Utah adoption statutes and case law on Sanchez's case. 
However, even after the hearing, Sanchez did not amend his complaint to state a cause of 
action under Utah's adoption statutes as set forth in U.C.A. §78-30-1 et seq. At the motion 
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hearing the court also established a time for discovery and set the case for trial on April 27, 
2000. 
As a consequence of the court's decision on their motion and based on Sanchez's 
causes of action as set forth in his pleadings, the Fluhmans prepared to defend themselves 
at trial against claims of fraud and fraudulent inducement. However, at trial, commencing 
with the court's opening discussions, the court determined that the Sanchez's case would 
proceed under Utah Adoption law as stated in U.C.A. §78-30-1 et seq. (Trial transcript, 
page 4, lines 10-25.) Further, in closing arguments Sanchez essentially abandoned his 
causes of action for fraud and fraudulent inducement (Trial transcript, page 221, lines 19-25 
and page 221, lines 1-12). With the court's coaching, Sanchez's case was presented and 
decided under U.C.A. §78-30-4.14. (Trial transcript, page 4, lines 10-25, page 5, lines 1-25, 
page 6, lines 1-12, and page 229, lines 18-23). 
Allowing Sanchez to present claims for relief under adoption law materially altered 
the type of case the Fluhmans were defending. A.t trial, Fluhmans were prepared to rebut 
claims that they acted with the intent of defrauding Sanchez or that they fraudulently 
induced Sanchez to action or inaction. However, whether the Fluhmans acted fraudulently 
did not even become an issue. The entire flavor of Sanchez's complaint was modified to 
reflect a claim for relief based on Parsons' failure to comply with the adoption statutes. 
Under due process standards recognized in State In the Interest of H.J. and in State 
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other than those set forth in his pleadings. As a result and to their detriment the Fluhmans 
were not properly prepared to defend the claims actually presented at trial or properly brief 
the court on the applicable statutes and case law. 
That the Fluhmans' lack of notice impeached their ability to properly prepare their 
defense and created confusion in the court is exemplified by several discussions between the 
court and the trial attorneys regarding U.C. A. §78-30-4.14(4). Beginning on page 223, line 
14 of the trial transcript and continuing through page 231; and in particular, on page 231, 
lines 16-23, the court expresses a great deal of concern about the Fluhmans' argument 
regarding the applicability of U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4). The court was agitated that the 
applicability of the statute had not previously been presented and briefed to the court. Later 
during the trial, the court again expressed its concern regarding the applicability of §78-30-
4.14(4) in a discussion between the court and Sanchez's attorney (Trial transcript, page 245, 
lines 8-25). And just for emphasis, the court, in rendering its decision, made this final 
statement regarding subparagraph 4: "I don't know what four means, but I don't think that's 
the applicable statute. I think the applicable statute is either 2(a) or 2(b)." (Id. at page 251, 
lines 4-6) T 
Of course, at this point the Fluhmans are not arguing U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4) applied 
or did not apply to the case. That issue will be dealt with later in this brief. Rather the cited 
exchanges are illustrative of the confusion created in the court and the harm caused to the 
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Fluhmans, when the court effectively permitted Sanchez to amend his causes of action 
without proper notice. Simply stated, the Fluhmans were not prepared nor were they 
properly able to educate the court concerning the applicable legal standards by which 
Sanchez's claims should be reviewed. Accordingly, the Fluhmans request that this case be 
remanded to the district court for retrial. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT SIDNEY WAS 
"PLACED FOR ADOPTION" WHEN SHE WAS AT 
LEAST SIX MONTHS OLD. 
The crux of Sanchez's argument at trial, under U.C. A. §78-30-4.14(1) and (2)(a), was 
that Sidney was placed for adoption after she was at least six month's old. Finding in favor 
of Sanchez, the trial court concluded in its Conclusions of Law, number 4: "In this action 
the child was "placedfor adoption " when the child was at least six (6) months old with the 
time being on approximately January 12, 1998 when the adoption was transferred to the 
Second District court in case number 982700016." 
The extension of Sanchez's argument and the court's conclusion was if Sidney was 
placed for adoption after she was six months old, then in petitioning to adopt Sidney, 
Parsons was legally required to obtain Sanchez's consent under U.C.A. §78-30-4.13 and 
4.14(1) if he met the applicable substantial relationship standards in §78-30-4.14(2). The 
court found in its Conclusions of Law, number 5, that Sanchez had developed a substantial 
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relationship with Sidney, as defined by §78-30-4.14(2)(a) pertaining to adoptees placed for 
adoption after they are more than six months old. 
Accordingly, the court effectively found that Sanchez's consent was required prior 
to Parsons' adoption of Sidney per the requirements of §78-30-4.14(1). The court concluded 
that because Sanchez had not been properly notified and his consent not obtained, the 
adoption, as applied to his rights as Sidney's natural father, was not perfected. 
The decision to reopen the adoption of Sidney as pertaining to Sanchez is in direct 
conflict with Utah's statutes and case law. Particularly troubling is the court's conclusion 
that the Sidney was not placed for adoption until the adoption petition was transferred to the 
Second District court, when Sidney was approximately 10 months old. 
It is clear from the record that the court reached this conclusion in order to render 
what it viewed as an equitable decision to a sympathetic plaintiff. (Trial transcript, page 225, 
lines 4-25). However, in order to reach this conclusion, the trial court ignored this court's 
decision in Matter of K.B.E, 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987). The circumstances of K.B.E. 
have some similarity to the issues in this case. 
In K.B.E., the natural mother arranged for her grandfather to adopt her yet to be bom 
child. The child is identified as T.M.E. After T.M.E. was bom, an adoption petition was 
filed providing for the T.M.E.'s adoption by the grandfather. Of note, in K.B.E. the 
adoption petition provided for joint custody of T.M.E. by the natural mother and her 
grandfather. The natural mother filed the adoption petition on the morning of T.M.E.'s 
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birth. The natural father filed an acknowledgment of paternity on the afternoon of the 
child's birth. Id. at 293. 
The issue this court decided in K.B.E. concerned whether the natural father's failure 
to file an acknowledgment of paternity prior the filing of a petition for adoption prevented 
him from contesting T.M.E. 's adoption. In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson urged this 
court to hold (under the previous Utah adoption statutes replaced by U.C.A. §§78-30-1 et 
seq. (1995)), where the natural mother intended to maintain a parent-child relationship with 
T.M.E. after the adoption, the natural mother had not relinquished or placed the chiM within 
the meaning of the statute that prohibited a natural father from contesting an adoption where 
he failed to file an acknowledgment of paternity prior the filing of the petition for adoption. 
Id. at 298. 
However, this court specifically rejected the rational urged by Justice Jackson. Id. 
at 295-296. While the court in K.B.E. granted the natural father judicial relief, it did so 
under a due process rational and on the basis that "the time lapse between filing the petition 
for adoption and filing the acknowledgment of paternity was so short that it demands the 
intervention of the equitable power of the court." Id. at 297. The reasoning behind the 
court's decision to reject the concurring opinion in K.B.E. extends to this case. First the 
court declined to imply a meaning to the term "placement" in place of legislative 
prerogative. Id. at 295. The court also recognized that the term placement was not defined 
in the statute or by law. Id. at 295. The court accepted the clear meaning of the law, holding 
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that the natural father failed to timely file his acknowledgment of paternity and even though 
the placement did not materially affect the relationship between T.M.E. and his natural 
mother. Id. at 295. Finally, the court stated that "This Court should not substitute its 
judgment for that of the legislature when it is not necessary to do so." Id. at 296. 
In the case at issue, the turning point of Sanchez's claim and the trial court's decision 
was that Sidney was not placed for adoption before she was six months old. The court 
found that placement did not occur until the misfiled adoption petition was moved to the 
proper venue within the Second District court. However, nowhere in Utah's statutes dealing 
with adoption or in the associated case law is there any language to support trial court's 
conclusion that placement did not occur until the adoption petition was filed in the 
appropriate venue. Utah adoption law simply does not equate placement with the filing of 
an adoption petition. 
In K.B.E., supra, this court specifically declined to hold adoptions, where the natural 
mother maintains a relationship with the adoptee, to a different notice and consent standard 
absent legislative intent. Id. at 295. Likewise in Matter of Adoption of C.M.G., 869 P.2d 997 
(Utah App. 1994) this court had a similar opportunity to again create a different notice and 
consent standard for adoptions where the natural mother maintains a relationship with the 
adoptee. In declining to create a new standard, this court recognized its decision in K.B.E. 
Footnote 2 of the opinion notes, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the court's decision in 
K.B.E. precluded it from finding a different standard for these types of adoptions. Id. at 999. 
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In this case, Fluhmans maintain that Sidney was placed with her adoptive parent at 
the very instant that Laura and Parsons decided that Parsons adoption of Sidney was 
appropriate - shortly after Sidney was released from the Hospital in April 1997. At the very 
latest, Sidney was placed for adoption with Parsons when Laura signed a "consent to adopt" 
and Parsons' petition was inadvertently filed in the Third District court on 21 April 1997. 
The Fluhmans take this position not on the basis that an adoption petition was filed, but 
because the filed petition is a non-arbitrary, verifiable manifestation that Laura placed 
Sidney for adoption with Parsons in April 1997. 
It should be noted, regarding the nature of consent, U.C.A. §78-30-4.20 provides: "A 
consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed and may not be revoked." 
Because the evidence is clear that Laura signed a consent to adopt, which was filed 
in the Third District Court along with Parsons Adoption Petition, this court should overturn 
the trial court and hold that placement occurred when Laura and Parsons demonstrated their 
intent that Parsons adopt Sidney. 
III. IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT SIDNEY WAS PLACED 
FOR ADOPTION BEFORE SHE WAS SIX MONTHS OLD, 
THEN THE COURT SHOULD ALSO HOLD THAT 
APPLICATION U.C.A.§78-30-4.14(2)(B) GOVERNS SANCHEZ'S 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO HER 
ADOPTION. 
If Sidney was placed for adoption prior six months of age, then the operative statute 
with regard to the necessity of Sanchez's consent is U.C.A.§78-30-4.14(l)(f) and (2)(b). 
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Subsection 1(f) provides: (I) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed child-placing 
agency or consent to adoption is required from: ...(f) an unmarried biological father of an 
adoptee, as defined in Section 78-30-4.11, only if the requirements and conditions of 
Subsection (2) (a) or (b) have been proven; 
Subsection 2(b) provides as follows: 
"With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the time he is placed with 
adoptive parents, an unmarried biological father shall have manifested a full commitment 
to his parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this subsection 
prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to 
a licensed child-placing agency. The father shall: 
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform 
Act on Paternity, and file with that court a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and 
willing to have full custody of the child, setting forth his plans for care of the child, and 
agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of expenses incurred in 
connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth; 
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state registrar 
of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in a confidential registry established by 
the department for that purpose; and 
(Hi) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid a fair and reasonable amount 
of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in 
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accordance with his means, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or 
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child." 
It cannot be disputed if this court holds as a matter of law that Sidney was placed for 
adoption before she was six months old, then Sanchez failed to meet the requirements of 
Subsection 2(b). Strict compliance with all Subsection 2(b) requirements was necessary to 
preserve his parental rights with regard to Sidney. Conversely, Sanchez did not initiate 
proceedings to establish paternity as required by Subsection 2(b)(i) and he did not file a 
notice of the commencement of paternity with the state registrar as required by Subsection 
2(b)(ii). 
As a result of Sanchez's failure to comply with Subsection 2(b), his consent for 
Sidney's adoption was not required. In a recent Utah Supreme Court decision, In Re 
Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999) the court made clear, under U.C.A. §§78-30-
4.12, 4.13, and 4.14, where an unmarried father fails to take the legal steps necessary to 
establish paternity, he forfeits his parental righls and is deemed to have "waived and 
surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to notice...and his consent 
to the adoption is not required." Id. at 970-971. 
Under In Re Adoption of B.B.D., Id., when Sanchez failed to take actions necessary 
to establish paternity, he forfeited any right he might have had to notice and consent under 
Sidney's adoption. Accordingly, Fluhmans request that this court set aside the trial court's 
decree providing that Sidney's adoption is not perfected as to Sanchez. 
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IV. U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4) PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE 
TO OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF AN UNMARRIED 
FATHER PRIOR TO AN ADOPTION. 
U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4) states: 
"If there is no showing that an unmarried biological father has consented to or 
waived his rights regarding a proposed adoption, the petitioner shall file with the court a 
certificate from the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health, stating 
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of notices from unmarried biological 
fathers described in Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has been found pertaining to the 
father of the child in question, or if a filing is found, stating the name of the putative father 
and the time and date of filing. That certificate shall be filed with the court prior to 
entrance of a final decree of adoption." 
Under this Subsection, the parties to an adoption can otherwise avoid the necessity 
of providing notice to an unmarried biological father by filing a certificate from the state 
registrar of vital statistics, stating that after a diligent search of the registry no filings have 
been found pertaining to the child in question. In the case at issue, the Fluhmans completed 
and filed three certificates of searches for paternity with the Utah Second District court prior 
to completion of Sidney's adoption. (Trial transcript, page 232, lines 7-17.) The court in 
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the adoption proceeding found that the requirements of the adoption statutes had been met 
and entered a decree of adoption. 
Accordingly, even if this court finds that Sanchez may have had rights to notice and 
consent with regard to Sidney's adoption, Fluhmans' compliance with U.C.A. §78-30-
4.14(4) obviated the notice and consent requirements of U.C.A. §78-30-4.13 and 4.14. 
Therefore, Fluhmans request this court set aside the trail court's decision that provides 
Sidney's adoption was not perfected as to Sanchez and hold that the adoption is perfected 
based on the Fluhmans' compliance with U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4). 
V. UNDER U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(3) THIS COURT SHOULD 
SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON 
THE BASIS THAT AN ADOPTION MAY NOT BE 
CONTESTED AFTER THE FINAL DECREE IS ENTERED. 
U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(1) defines the remedies a court may use when a party contests 
an adoption, including the remedies available to a party entitled to notice and consent under 
"the provision of this chapter..." Id. However, U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(3) expressly limits the 
time period for contesting an adoption. Subsection 3 states: 
An adoption may not be contested after the final decree of adoption is entered. 
In this case, the final decree on Sidney's adoption by Parsons was entered by the Utah 
Second District court on 9 February 1998. At trial, Sanchez testified that Laura told him in 
February 1998 that Parsons had adopted Sidney. (Trial transcript, page 40, lines 2-11.) 
However, Sanchez waited until September 1998 before filing the complaint which gave rise 
to this case. 
In the Utah Supreme Court decision, In Re Adoption of B.B.D., supra, the court 
recognized that the state has a compelling interest in the adoption process. Id. at 970. The 
court upheld the legality U.C.A. §78-30-4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 and the state's compelling 
interest defining the rights of the parties to an adoption Id. at 970,971. Under U.C.A. §78-
30-4.12(3)(a) the state has specifically defined when an unmarried biological father's actions 
are sufficiently prompt and substantial to require protection. The statute further provides 
under U.C.A. §§78-30-4.12(3)(b) and (c): 
"(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the opportunities to establish a 
relationship with his child that are available to him, his biological parental interest may be 
lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitutional significance by his failure to timely 
exercise it, or by his failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate 
it. 
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the state's 
compelling interest The Legislature finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the 
child, and the adoptive parents described in this section outweigh the interest of an 
unmarried biological father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and 
demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with the requirements of this 
chapter." 
In this case, not only did Sanchez fail to protect his interests by complying with 
requirements to establish paternity prior to Sidney's adoption, but he waited until seven 
months after he was notified the adoption occurred to file an action contesting the adoption. 
As a result application of U.C. A. §78-30-4.16(3) prohibits Sanchez from contesting Sidney's 
adoption. Accordingly and on this basis, Fluhmans request this court set aside the trial court 
decision that provides Sidney's adoption was not perfected as to Sanchez and hold that the 
adoption is perfected under U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(3). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision that the adoption of Sidney by Parsons was not perfected 
as to Sanchez is fatally flawed for the reasons set forth herein. From the beginning, by 
bringing an action based on fraud, Sanchez failed to state a cause of action on which the 
court could grant the relief he wanted - which was for the adoption to be set aside. U.C. A. 
§78-30-4.15 clearly provides that all parties to an adoption are responsible for their own 
actions and that fraud is not a basis for setting aside an adoption. At trial Sanchez 
recognized this and attempted rehabilitate his claims under U.C.A. §78-30-4.14, arguing the 
adoption should be set aside on the basis that he was entitled to notice and an opportunity 
to consent. 
However, Sanchez's rehabilitation of his cause of action at trial and the trial court's 
decision to permit allow it, violated Fluhmans' due process right to timely notice regarding 
the issues to be heard before the court. Because Fluhmans were not adequately advised 
regarding the issues Sanchez would be allowed to raise at trial, the court's decision should 
set aside and this case remanded for a new trial. 
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Even if this court finds that Fluhmans had sufficient notice regarding :he issues 
Sanchez would raise at trial, the trial court's decision should still be set aside. Under Utah 
adoption law Sanchez, as an unmarried father, had statutory notice that an adoption 
proceeding regarding Sidney may occur. 
U.C.A. §78-30-4.13(1). The law clearly requires that unmarried fathers take 
affirmative steps defined by law to protect their rights as to children born outside the bonds 
of legal marriage. When he failed to file the appropriate acknowledgments concerning 
paternity prior to the time Sidney was placed for adoption, Sanchez legally waived any 
rights he might have had to notice and an opportunity to consent to the adoption. 
Under the law, Laura placed Sidney for adoption when she and Parsons agreed to 
proceed with the petition. In furtherance of that decision, Laura executed a consent to adopt 
and Parsons filed an Adoption Petition in April 1997, when Sidney was less than one month 
old. Under U.C.A. §78-30-4.14, in situations where a child is placed for adoption before 
it is six months old, in order to protect his rights, an unmarried father must initiated 
proceedings to establish paternity and file appropriate notice with the state registrar of vital 
statistics before the mother executes her consent. Under the statute, Sanchez failed to 
protect his interests by filing the appropriate documents and initiating proceedings to 
establish paternity. Under the law, Sanchez is strictly liable for his own actions and in 
failing to protect his interests, Sanchez forfeited his right to contest Sidney's adoption. 
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In the event this court finds that Sanchez did comply with the law as pertaining to his 
right to receive notice and consent to Sidney's adoption, the trial court still erred in 
reopening the adoption proceedings. As demonstrated herein, the state and interested parties 
have a compelling interest in the finality of adoption proceedings. To achieve that end, the 
state has woven several protections into its adoption statutes. U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4) 
provides, with regard to unmarried biological fathers, that a party can obviate the need for 
notice and consent by filing a certificate from the state registrar stating that a diligent search 
has been made of the registry of notices from unmarried biological fathers and that no filing 
has been found pertaining to the father of the child in question. 
In accordance with U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4), the Fluhmans filed three such notices 
with the Second District Court prior to the time the final decree of adoption was entered. 
Based on the information presented, the adoption court appropriately found that adoption 
was in Sidney's best interest and granted Parsons' petition. As a result, under U.C.A. §78-
30-4.16(3) which provides that an adoption cannot be contested after the final decree of 
adoption is entered, the trial court should have barred Sanchez from contesting the adoption. 
The Fluhmans recognize that the trial court was sympathetic to the claims raised by 
Sanchez and that as presented at trial, his claims placed the court in a quandary in terms of 
enforcing the letter of the law and equitable consideration. However, with regard to the law 
of adoption, the trial court's sympathies were misplaced. The law clearly recognizes a need 
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for finality in adoption proceedings and imposes on unmarried fathers strict requirements 
which they must meet to protect their paternal interests. While during the course of his 
relationship with Laura and Sidney Sanchez took some of the steps necessary to protect his 
interests, he failed to meet the most significant legal requirements and in failing to do so 
waived his paternal rights. 
The law applicable to this case clearly establishes that Sanchez failed to comply with 
the Utah adoption statutes' admittedly rigorous standards. However, consistently and most 
recently in In Re Adoption of B.B.D., supra, the Utah Supreme Court and this court have 
upheld Utah's adoption law. The Fluhman's request that this court do so again in this case 
and grant them they relief requested herein. 
DATED t h i s o ^ day of October, 2000. 
RANDLE, DEAMER, McCONKIE & LEE 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney at Law 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
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Randy S. Ludlow #2011 
Attorney for Petitioner 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-1300 
Fax: (S01) 322-1628 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIMOTHY D SANCHEZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LAURA FLUHMAN, PAIGE PARSONS, 
and SIDNEY LAKEN FLUHMAN by and 
through his Guardian Ad Litem, 
Respondents. 
COMPLAINT 
CaseNo. W ? g / 5 c ^ d 5 
COMES NOW the petitioner who complains and alleges as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"" 1. The plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, state of Utah. 
-N 2, All acts in this matter occurred within Davis County, state of Utah. 
•«-. 3. Sidney Laken Fluhman is a minor child born on March 26,1997. 
n4. Sidney Laken Fluhman has not had a Guardian Ad Litem appointed for her. 
5. The plaintiff is the natural father of Sidney Lake Fluhman. 
[ 6. Laura Fluhman is the natural mother of Sidney Laken Fluhman! 
*7, Paige Parsons is the natural mother of Laura Fluhman, 
8. The plaintiff and Laura Fluhman had become involved in a relationship that resulted in 
Laura Fluhman becoming pregnant. 
^ 9. After Laura Fluhman became pregnant the plaintiff commenced paying to her $100 per 
month for aid and support during her pregnancy. 
^ i 0, Laura Fluhman had always informed the plaintiff that he would be involved in the child's 
life upon the birth of the child and that the two parties had made arrangements for the natural mother 
to call plaintiff when the deliver)' of the birth of the child was eminent and to thereafter act in all 
respects as the natural father to the child and the child would be given his surname of Sanchez upon 
I Us birth. 
I N 
J -' 1L At the time of the birth of the child Laura Fluhman did not inform the plaintiff that the 
Ichild was in fact born and he was informed of the birth by a third person and upon that information 
I went to the University of Utah Medical Center to see and observe the child. 
I r 12. Upon arrival at the University of Utah Medical Center the plaintiff was informed that the 
Ichild was not located there when the child was in feet at that location but said hospital had been 
Informed by Laura Fluhman not to inform the plaintiff of the birth of the child nor to allow him to see 
lithe child. 
it 
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" ~ 13. Upon attendance at the University Hospital the plaintiff had informed the staff at said 
hospital that he was at that center in order to see his child and to see if he was in fact on the birth 
certificate for the child and was after informed that the child was not located there by said staflf based 
upon statements and requests that had been made by Laura Fiuhman to hospital personnel. 
14. The plaintiff did not put his name on the birth certificate nor on an acknowledgment of 
[paternity based upon the statements as made to him by hospital personnel, 
O 15. The plaintiff would have put his name on the birth certificate but for the actions taken by 
he defendant, Laura Fiuhman, and her statements to hospital personnel. 
-. 16, Subsequent to the child's birth the plaintiff thereafter was informed b\ Laura Fiuhman 
fcat she would allow visitation and he commenced visiting the child and has continued to visit the 
ifhild continuously thereafter 
- 17. The child, Sidney Laken Fiuhman, was born on March 26, 1997. 
>' 18. Since the birth of Sidney Laken Fiuhman the plaintiff has paid to Laura Fiuhman child 
sfipport in the s&ira of $175 per month until February 1998 
fv 19. In February 1998 the plaintiff was informed that Laura Fiuhman had had the child 
a|opted by her mother, Paige Parsons. 
- 20. Laura Fiuhman had informed the plaintiff that the reason for the adoption by Paige 
Persons of Sidney Laken Fiuhman was for insurance purposes. 
i * 
00*05490.98 3 
j£ 21. The piaintiffhad informed Laura Fiuhman at all times that he had insurance coverage on 
behalf of the child and that insurance coverage was not necessary. 
\ "^s '22, The plaintiff has been infonned by Laura Fiuhman since the time that she had the child 
^adopted by Paige Parsons that Laura Fiuhman is in fact acting as the natural mother for the child, 
attending the child, taking care of the child and further informing him that when she manies that she 
intends to thereafter have the child adopted back to her and her then husband. 
23. At all times in this matter Paige Parsons and Laura Fiuhman have acted together and 
conspired with one another in order to prohibit and restrict the plajntiffs rights to Sidney Laken 
Fiuhman. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
y 24. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs I through 23 as though fully set forth herein, 
]/ 25. The minor child, Sidney Laken Fiuhman should have appointed a Guardian Ad Litem in 
his behalf 
2s 26. The Guardian Ad Litem that is to be appointed for him should be a person other than 
[either of the other defendants and should be an individual from the Guardian Ad Litem program of 
Ithe Second District Court. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
J ? 27. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 26 as though fully set forth herein. 
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' j 28. The plaintiff at all times intended to act as the natural father for Sidney Laken Fluhman 
and has acted as the natural father for Sidney Laken Fluhiman. 
V 29. The defendants Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons have accomplished an adoption which 
adoption is fraudulent with no real purpose other than to prohibit the plaintiff from having his parental 
rights with Sidney Laken Fluhman. 
J ~y 30, The defendants, Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons, conspired with one another to 
Jfraudulently and/or wrongfully adopt Sidney Laken Fluhman to Paige Parsons 
]?31. Said adoption is in fact a sham with no real purpose other than to prohibit the plaintiff 
Jrom acting as the natural father to Sidney Laken Fluhman. 
y 32. The adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman to Paige Parsons should be set aside and declared 
fo be a nulity. 
[/ 33. Upon the adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman to Paige Parsons being set aside that the 
Jlaintiff thereafter would be deemed as being the natural father of said child and given all rights, 
jjrivileges and responsibilities as a natural parent together with being allowed appropriate visitation 
tf> said child as provided pursuant to statute. 
y 34, Upon the setting aside of the adoption the child, Sidney Laken Fluhman, would be given 
te surname of the petitioner, 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
J ) 35. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 as though fully set forth herein. 
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y 36. In the alternative that the court does not set aside the adoption that the plaintiff be 
awarded the judgement against Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons in a sum of not less than $500,000 
for special and general damages together with punitive and exemplary damages as deemed 
appropriate based upon their fraudulent and wrongful acts and conspiring to wrongftilly prohibit and 
terminate his rights as a parent to Sidney Laken Fluhman 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
/ 37, The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 36 as though fully set forth herein. 
y 38. The statements as made by Laura Fluhman that she would allow the plaintiff to be the 
natural father and act in all respects as the natural parent to Sidney Laken Fluhman, were statements 
[which were fraudulent at the time the statements were made to plaintiff 
I y 39. The statements as made by Laura Fluhman to the plaintiff were done for the sole purpose 
jof inducing him to take a course of action whereby he would not file pleadings to be declared the 
child's father and/or misleading him to not enter into documents to make claims as being the natural 
parent of Sidney Lake Fluhman. 
t - P 40. Said statements were falsely made at the time that they were made with the sole purpose 
of inducing him to rely upon said statements. 
I J ? 41. But for the statements as made by Laura Fluhman the plaintiff would have taken 
appropriate action to have him declared to be the natural father of Sidney Laken Fluhman. 
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D 42, The plaintiff relied to his detriment upon the statements as made by Laura Fluhman to 
him. 
p 43. The statements were misleading and fraudulently made for the intent that he would rely 
Lpon the statements to his detriment, 
7> 44, Because of the statements as made by Laura Fluhman to him he has now been damaged 
^ 45, Paige Parsons conspired with Laura Fluhman to take the course of action above in order 
[o prohibit the plaintiff from being the natural father to Sidney Laken Fluhman. 
[ J? 46 The plaintiffshould be awarded general and special damages plus punitive and exemplary 
damages against the defendants, Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons in the sum of not less than 
1500,000 or what other additional sums the court deems to be appropriate and just in this matter. 
[ WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgement as follows: 
1. For the court to appoint a Guardian Ad Litem for Sidney Laken Fluhman and to have the 
stime from the Guardian Ad Litem program under the First Cause of Action. 
I 2. To set aside the adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman and to have the plaintiff declared to 
bl the natural father of Sidney Laken Fluhman with him awarded ail rights, titles and obligations as 
vjfculd be appropriate for a natural father including the requirements of paying support, visitation and 
alike under the Second Cause of Action 
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3. For judgement against the defendants Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons for the wrongful 
adoption in the sum of $500,000 together with what other punitive and exemplary damages the coun 
Jdeems appropriate and just under the Third Cause of Action. 
4. For the sum of $500,000 together with what other punitive and exemplary damages the 
|:ourt deems appropriate and just under the Fourth Cause of Action. 
5. For all attorneys fees incurred herein and any and all other additional relief the court would 
j|eem appropriate and just in this matter. 
DATED this ( \ day of September, 1998 
B J U ^ \ ^ l ) D L b W 
Attorney t^ uElaintifF 
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ADDENDUM "2" 
RahdyS. Ludlow #2011 
Attorney lor Petitioner 
331 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Sal Lake City, Utah 841II 
Tefcphone: (801) 531-1300 
Fa* (801) 322-1628 
S- l i 'M 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
TTNJOTHY SANCHEZ, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LAURA FLUHMAN, PAIGE PARSONS, 
and f IDNH Y LAKEN FLUHMAN, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.984701550CS 
Judge Thomas L Kay 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on the 27* day of April, 1999. The 
petitioner was present and represented by his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondents, 
Lauri Ftuhman and Patricia Paige Parsons were present and represented by their attorney of record, 
KeitH E. Eddmgton. The court having taken testimony together with' receiving exhibits from the 
parties, the court having previously had filed memorandums and based upon such and for good cause 
appearing herein the court makes these its 
« «e*d »iv axMNOOOM uyvz uawvaa aiaNVU «- i 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. All parties in this matter are and were at all times residents of Davis County. 
2. The petitioner and Laura Fluhman had. a sexual relationship. 
3. As a result of the sexual relationship between petitioner and Laura Fluhman the parties had 
bo$i to them a child, to wit: Sidney Liken Fluhman who was bora on March 26.1997. 
44 The petitioner went to the hospital where the child was bom in order to see the child and 
to ^rtenmne what was necessary in order to have him deemed As the father of the child. 
5. Upon going to the hospital the petitioner was informed that the child was not there by the 
|ital staff based on information given to the staff by Laura Fluhman. 
6. The petitioner thereafter was able to see the child at the hospital. 
7. After the child was born the petitioner began to visit with the child and he commenced 
maldfig child support payments. 
8. Prior to the birth of the child the petitioner had given some monies to the respondent, 
Lauri Fluhman. 
t 9. The petitioner continued to give to Laura Fluhman child support in the amount of 
apprtkimatdy $165.00 per month commencing April 1997 whichTie increased to $175.00 in 
December 1997 and continued thereafter in until he went to make the February 1998 payment which 
was tiercafter refused to be accepted by the respondent, Laura Fluhmaa It was at this time that she 
infonted the petitioner of the adoption of her child by Paige Parsons (aka Patricia Paige Parsons). 
0000*0 it** 
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10. Paige Parsons is the mother of Laura Fluhman and is the grandmother of Sidney Laken 
Ffchman, 
11. Before coronwKing the child supponpaym 
thi America First Credit Union account of Latin Fluhman prior to the child's birth. He also 
purchased various herns for the baby including clothing, book; changing table, diapers, toys and other 
taps for and on behalf of the child. 
12. The petitioner had continually visited with the child since its birth and did so twice a 
nujhth on average and was thereafter allowed to do the same after the adoption had occurred until 
approximately August 1998. 
13. On April 21,1997 the respondent, Paige Parsons, filed a petition for adoption seeking 
th«| adoption of Sidney Fluhman which petition was filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
Copxity, in case no. 972900190AD. 
14. Patricia Paige Parsons, respondent herein, was a resident of Davis County as was the 
chifl at the time of the filing of the petition in Sah Lake County. 
15. No actions were taken by Patricia Paige Parsons to complete the adoption or to do any 
othfcr acts until such time that she filed a Motion for Ownge of Vciro 
Janpary I2» 1998 which would have been approximately ten (10) months after the birth of Sidney 
Laifcn Fluhmaa 
16. It is not disputed that the petitioner is in fact the natural father of Sidney Laken Fluhman. 
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I 17. No notice was sent to the petitioner or any contact made by either Laura Fluhman or 
Page Parsons informing him of Paige Persons9 intent to adopt Sidney Laken Fluhman. 
i 18. In February 1998t the petition seeking the adoption by Patricia Paige Paraoos of Sidney 
Laken Fluhman was granted by the Second District Court, Davis County, state of Utah and a Decree 
of Adoption was entered in case no. 982700016. Sidney Laken Fluhman was approximately eleven 
(11} months old at the time this Decree had been entered. 
19. After the adoption had occurred the petitk)nerv/a$ informed by the respondents th^ 
bass for the adoption was to albw Sidney Laken Fluhman to be placed on the insurance of Patricia 
Paige Parsons. 
20. The petitioner at alt times ha* had medi^ 
and pffered that insurance to Laura Fluhman and she refused it. 
21. The petitioner did not file an acknowledgment of paternity in this matter. 
22. The petitioner had in feet developed and established a relationship with the minor child 
prion to being prohibited from continuing with that relationship by the respondents. 
23. The respondent, Laura Fluhman, has health problems and it was her intent and desire that 
should something happen to her as a result of her health problems tha{ the child not be raised by the 
* but only be allowed to be raised by her mother Pallida Paige Parsons. 
24. Since the birth of the child the child has continuously lived with the respondent Laura 
Fhihman. Laura Fluhman takes care of the child each day including the preparation of the child's 
OOOOttf.9* 
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« stimlariy as a grandparent. 
From the foregoing findings of Fact the court mates these its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(UJfao m without jurisdiction to act. 
I 3 P^^^<^«^S 7, .3o.7i,r a^^^p e d t l o ( l f c r K M O T b < f f l e d 
Dajns County. 
to l ie Secnn/f TV*^^ -
m 
to lie Second Diarictcounm 
000*0 L3J^ 
3 t * d 
N T * axxNooow wuvz aatwaa 31QNVU <- t 
iFuofO V4T*60 0 0 - 6 0 - a * W 
fee*o oo/o /© ; p « A ^ « o t u 
5. The petitioner had developed a substantial relationship with the child in view of the child's 
agi The petitioner had visited with the child at least monthly. The petitioner had taken a measure 
of responsibility to provide for the child including obtaining gifts, providing money to the natural 
mother, support payments and monies given during the natural mother's pregnancy. The petitioner 
hail demonstrated a full commitment to the child and was willing to do even more than he hid 
previously given to the child. He spent time with the child under the restrictions and prohibitions as 
put;|ipon him by the respondents. 
6. Because the respondent, Laura Fhihman,^ 
plaJcmetf has never been such as to put the peth 
statfte. "Placement" means having the person on notice Uwrt something has occuned. In this action 
notffng has occurred that could be seen or deemed as ptaciing the petitioner on notice that the child 
waif placed for adoption11. 
7. The adoption in probate number 982700016AD on February 9,1998 is not perfected as 
to tlfe petitioner. * • ^ 
DATED this %JAK day o f ^ 0 9 9 9 
SMfc }* 
onanist. 
BY THE COURT: 
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ADDENDUM "3" 
4 
THE COURT: OKAY. UNDER THE CASES THAT ARE 
IMPOSSIBILITY EXCEPTION AND SO IS THAT APPLICABLE. 
MR. EDDINGTON: IT IS NOT. 
THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT THE DUE PROCESS? 
MR. EDDINGTON: THE DUE PROCESS, IF YOU WANT TO 
ADDRESS THAT FOR A MINUTE, I'D BE HAPPY TO ADDRESS THAT. 
HIS DUE PROCESS CLAIM HAS BEEN RAISED MANY OTHER TIMES. 
BASICALLY WHAT THE COURTS HAVE RULED IS THAT THERE IS NO 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNLESS AND UNTIL HE HAS MET THE BURDEN, 
ESTABLISHED THE RELATIONSHIP, DONE THE THINGS THAT THEY 
REQUIRED IN THE STATUTE BEFORE THERE'S A CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO EVEN PROTECT. HE'S GIVEN AN INCHOATE RIGHT IS THE 
WAY THEY REFER TO IN BELL TRAN. AN INCHOATE RIGHT, IN FACT 
IN THE STATUTE, THAT HE NEEDS TO COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH BY THE LEGISLATURE BEFORE HE EVEN HAS 
AN INTEREST TO BE DENIED ANY DUE PROCESS OF. AND HE HASN'T 
DONE THAT. 
THE COURT: IN THIS BELL TRAN CASE THEY REFER TO 
THE CASE IN RE: ADOPTION OF BABY BOY DOE. AND IN THAT CASE 
THE SUPREME COURT REVERSED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING A 
PERSON WHO DIDN'T COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE BECAUSE IT SAID 
THAT EVERYONE INVOLVED IN THE FATHER'S OPPOSITION TO 
ADOPTION, THE FATHER WAS NOT A UTAH RESIDENT, WAS ABSENT AT 
THE TIME OF THE BIRTH, THE MOTHER HAD FALSELY REPRESENTED 
SHE WOULD NOT PLACE THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION AND HER FAMILY 
1 HAD DELIBERATELY WITHHELD INFORMATION FROM THE FATHER ABOUT 
2 THE MOTHER'S PLANS FOR ADOPTION. NOW, I KNOW ALL THOSE 
3 FACTS AREN'T HERE BECAUSE HE WAS A UTAH RESIDENT. 
4 MR. LUDLOW: EXACTLY. 
5 THE COURT: BUT ISN'T PART OF HIS CLAIM THAT PEOPLE 
6 FALSELY REPRESENTED THINGS TO HIM. 
7 MR. LUDLOW: HIS CLAIM ON ITS FACE IS A FRAUD 
8 CLAIM. BUT THAT CLEARLY THE STATUTE DEALS WITH THAT. HE 
9 HAS THE BURDEN OF AVOIDING THE FRAUD. IT'S CLEARLY 
.0 DIFFERENT THAN IN THE BABY DOE CASE. HE DID NOT RESIDE OUT 
.1 OF STATE. HE RESIDED HERE. THEREFORE HE IS EXPECTED TO 
.2 KNOW AND COMPLY WITH THE STATUTES AS THEY ARE HERE. NOT 
.3 ONLY THAT, BUT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, EVEN BY HIS OWN 
L4 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN HIS COMPLAINT, HE WAS AWARE OF THE BIRTH 
L5 OF THE CHILD. HE WAS AWARE OF WHERE SHE WAS. HE WAS AWARE 
L6 OF NOT PLACING HIM ON THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OR AT LEAST 
L7 THAT'S WHAT HE BELIEVED BASED ON WHAT THE HOSPITAL PERSONNEL 
L8 WAS TELLING HIM. HE EASILY HAD TIME TO COMPLY AND TO DEAL 
L9 WITH THE ISSUES AT THE TIME. AND HERE WE ARE ALMOST 18 
20 MONTHS LATER BEFORE HE FILES AN ACTION AND THEN HE FILES IF 
21 AS A FRAUD ACTION. AS LATE AS OCTOBER WE HAVE PROOF OF THAT 
22 HE STILL HAD NOT EVEN CLAIMED PATERNITY. MONTHS AND MONTHS 
23 AND MONTHS AFTER HE WAS AWARE OF THE ADOPTION, AFTER HE WAS 
24 AWARE OF THE BIRTH, THAT HE WAS NOT ON THE BIRTH 
25 CERTIFICATE, EVEN GIVEN HIS FACTS WHICH WE CONTEST A 
1 SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF THEM, BUT EVEN GIVEN HIS FACTS, HIS 
2 CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON ITS FACE. THERE'S NO BASIS. HE 
3 HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH ANY OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. 
4 THE COURT: YOU ARE CERTAIN IF IT GOT DISMISSED 
5 RIGHT NOW YOU'D HAVE A REALLY GOOD SLAM DUNK ON APPEAL WHERE 
6 THE SUPREME COURT HAS SAID ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE 
7 RAISED YOU OUGHT TO AT LEAST HAVE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
8 MR. EDDINGTON: I'M CONVINCED THAT EVEN ON APPEAL 
9 WE'D BE FINE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. IF WE WANT TO 
10 ADDRESS SOME OF THOSE TODAY, I'D BE HAPPY TO DO THAT. 
11 THE COURT: WELL, IT'S YOUR MOTION. ALL I CAN SAY 
12 IS ON A MOTION TO DISMISS THE STANDARD WITH THE SUPREME 
13 COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS IS THAT, YOU KNOW, IT'S EASY 
14 TO REVERSE THAT. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A LITTLE BETTER. THE 
15 TRIAL IS THE BEST. SO ALL I'M SAYING IS THAT I DON'T WANT 
16 TO SEE THIS THING THREE TIMES. IF YOU GRANT THE MOTION AND 
17 THEN A YEAR AND A HALF FROM NOW THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES 
18 IT SAYING THAT I SHOULD HAVE HEARD EVIDENCE BEFORE I RULED, 
19 THAT'S WHAT IT GETS TO THE ISSUE. I MEAN, TO ME --
20 MR. EDDINGTON: I SUPPOSE THAT'S WHY I HESITATED 
21 WHEN YOU ASKED WHETHER IT WAS A MOTION TO DISMISS OR 
22 SUMMARY JUDGMENT. IT WAS BROUGHT AS A MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
23 I'M CONFIDANT IT CAN BE HANDLED THAT WAY. BUT IF THE COURT 
24 IS INTERESTED IN HEARING ANY EVIDENCE OR DEALING WITH IT, 
25 I'D BE HAPPY TO PUT THAT EVIDENCE ON. 
THAT TIME PERIOD. THAT'S WHEN DOES THE ADOPTION COMES TO 
FRUITION. I CONSIDER IT INTERESTING THAT SHE, ON THE 
DOCUMENTS THAT SHE FILED AND ALSO THAT WERE FILED ON THE 
PETITION, BOTH OF THEM SAY AN UNKNOWN FATHER. AND THAT'S 
JUST FLAT OUT UNTRUE. BOTH THESE PEOPLE KNOW WHO THE FATHER 
WAS. 
THE COURT: WELL, AND I UNDERSTAND WHAT THE STATUTE 
SAYS. I THINK THE BETTER THING THERE IS IS THE MOTHER OF 
THE CHILD SAYING HER CONSENT WAS NOT TO CUT TIM OFF. WELL, 
IT DID. 
MR. LUDLOW: IT DID. 
THE COURT: THAT WASN'T HER INTENT, YOU KNOW. I 
MEAN, MY QUESTION IS WHY DON'T THEY LET ANYBODY KNOW. IT 
WASN'T THAT HE WAS GOING TO GET CUSTODY OF THE CHILD. YOU 
KNOW, IF HE WAS GIVEN NOTICE OF THE ADOPTION, HE WAS GOING 
TO ARGUE FOR WHAT HE'S ARGUING NOW AND THAT IS THE CHANCE TO 
HAVE VISITATION. 
MR. LUDLOW: THAT IS ALL HE'S ARGUING, SIR. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. WHAT IF THAT DOESN'T 
HAPPEN AND YOU SAY, OKAY. I FIND YOU DON'T MEET THE 
STANDARDS, THEN WHAT ARE YOU SAYING ABOUT THE OTHER CLAIMS 
ABOUT DAMAGES FOR WHAT THESE PEOPLE HAVE DONE. 
MR. LUDLOW: THE STATUTE DOES SPECIFICALLY ALLOW 
FOR AN ACTION TO BE MAINTAINED EVEN IF IT'S BEEN WRONGFULLY 
DONE BY THEM. THE COURT CAN AWARD MONEY DAMAGES. OUR 
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UNLESS THE FATHER WASN NECESSARY TO BE CONTACTED IN ORDER 
FOR THE ADOPTION TO OCCUR. AND I THINK THAT CASE HAS THE 
SAME THINGS AND ELEMENTS. WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT WHAT'S 
HAPPENING IN THIS CHILD, THE CHILD STILL BEING THERE NEVER 
HAVING LITERALLY BEEN RELINQUISHED. AND TOPPING THAT OFF 
WITH WHAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE PETITIONER HAS IN FACT 
ESTABLISHED A RELATIONSHIP AND DONE SO IN THE CONFINES OF 
WHAT HAS BEEN REQUESTED. THAT THE COURT SHOULD IN FACT SETD 
ASIDE THE ADOPTION AND ALLOW HIM TO BE DEEMED AS BEING THE 
FATHER AND GIVE HIM HIS VISITATION FOR THIS CHILD AND HE'LL 
PAY THE SUPPORT. THAT'S TRULY WHAT WE WANT. 
THE COURT: WELL, LET'S HEAR FROM THE OTHER SIDE 
THEN YOU'LL GET YOUR LAST OPPORTUNITY. 
MR. EDDINGTON: YOUR HONOR, AGAIN, WE RESPECTFULLY 
REPEAT THAT WE SHOULDN'T BE HERE. 
THE COURT: WELL, YOU KNOW WHAT? IF WE SHOULDN'T 
HAVE BEEN I'VE SURE WASTED ABOUT FROM 8:30 TILL FOUR TODAY 
AND ALL MY LUNCH DOING NOTHING BUT READING THIS STUFF. AND 
YOU KNOW, NOT BEING ABLE TO EVEN ENJOY MY TWO PIECEES OF 
BREAD I HAD TO EAT. 
MR. EDDINGTON: I UNDERSTAND THAT. I'M SURE THAT 
THE PARTIES AREN'T NECESSARILY THRILLED EITHER. BUT MY 
WHOLE POINT, I BELIEVE THAT THE ADOPTION WAS GRANTED IN 
FEBRUARY OF '98. 
THE COURT: THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. YOU 
1 MR. EDDINGTON: I'M NOT SAYING THAT THAT IS. LET 
2 ME ADDRESS THAT BECAUSE THAT'S OBVIOUSLY A CONCERN THE COURT 
3 HAS. 
4 THE COURT: I'VE GOT A BIG CONCERN. THE ONE 
5 CONCERN IS I HAVE A BIOLOGICAL FATHER WHO COMES IN HERE AND 
6 I HAVE CASE AFTER CASE WHERE PEOPLE DON'T WANT TO PAY CHILD 
7 SUPPORT. NOW I HAVE SOMEONE VOLUNTEERINGING TO DO SO. I 
8 HAVE SOMEONE WHO'S SAYING, IF I DON'T GIVE YOU WHAT YOU ASK 
9 FOR, WHAT ABOUT MONEY AND THEY SAY THEY DON'T WANT MONEY. 
10 YOU KNOW, THAT'S RARE THINGS THAT I'VE HEARD. AND IF IT'S 
11 STRATEGY, IT'S A GOOD ONE. BECAUSE IT'S RARE. SO WHAT I 
12 HAVE HERE IS SOMEONE SAYING THAT I DON'T WANT TO CUT OFF, 
13 YOU KNOW, THE RIGHTS OF TIM, BUT YOU KNOW, WHAT WE'RE 
14 GOING TO DO IS KEEP HIM IN THE DARK; NOT LET HIM KNOW ABOUT 
15 IT. AND THEN AFTER THE FACT SAY, WE GOT AN ADOPTION. I 
16 MEAN, THAT'S BASICALLY WHAT I'M FACED WITH. ESPECIALLY 
17 AFTER SOMETHING WAS FILED IN APRIL OF '97 THEN MOVED HERE IN 
18 JANUARY OR FEBRUARY '98. THEN SOMEBODY WHO WAS LOOKING AT 
19 THIS SHOULD HAVE THEN SAID, WHEW, NOW WE'RE HERE IN JANUARY 
20 OF '98. MAYBE WE'RE GOING TO BE UNDER THE CHILD OVER TEN 
21 MONTHS RULE OR CHILD OVER SIX MONTHS. SHE'S NOW TEN. THEN, 
22 ARE WE GOING TO BE ABLE TO PROVE THIS OR NOT. ARE WE GOING 
23 TO MAKE A CALCULATED RISK THAT WE CAN PROVE THIS AND WE'RE 
24 NOT GOING TO TELL HIM ANYTHING AND THEN I CAN BRING THIS UP 
25 LATER AND CHALLENGE IT AND WE'LL SEE IF WE CAN DEFEAT IT. 
1 ARE SAYING HE DOESN'T NEED TO KNOW. 
2 MR. EDDINGTON: UH-HUH. 
3 THE COURT: WELL, I CAN TELL YOU ONE THING THAT MAY 
4 BE WHAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS, BUT FOR THE LAST THREE TIMES 
5 THAT I'VE HAD SOMEBODY TRYING TO DO THIS IN MY COURT WHEN I 
6 HAVE BEEN DOING AN ADOPTION, I BROUGHT TWO OR THREE PEOPLE 
7 OUT OF PRISON WHO WERE THE BIOLOGICAL FATHERS TO CONTEST IT 
8 AND LET THEM SIT HERE AND RAISE THEIR THING. I DON'T TAKE 
9 IT LIGHTLY. AND I KNOW A LOT OF OTHER JUDGES BASICALLY COME 
10 IN HERE, SIGN SOME PAPERS AND TURN IT OVER. AND I DON'T 
11 HAVE ANY RECORD OF WHAT JUDGE VANWAGNEN DID OTHER THAN YOU 
12 CAME IN AND DID THE -- AND HE SIGNED THE PAPERS. YOU KNOW, 
13 I DON'T HAVE ANY EVIDENCE OF WHAT TOOK PLACE. SO THAT'S 
14 WHAT I'M CONCERNED ABOUT. I MEAN, I'M CONCERNED. AND IF 
15 YOU CAN WALK ME THROUGH SAYING WHY THIS CAN'T HAPPEN CHAPTER 
16 AND VERSE, THAT'S WHAT YOU NEED TO DO. BUT THIS IS AN 
17 UNUSUAL SITUATION WHERE WE'VE GOT A PLAINTIFF IN THIS 
18 SETTING WHO BASICALLY SAYS, BEST CASE. I WANT TO JUST SEE 
19 THE CHILD AND HAVE STANDARD VISITATION AND THEN PAY CHILD 
20 SUPPORT AND I DON'T WANT ANY OTHER MONEY IF I DON'T GET 
21 THAT. AND I'M NOT SAYING THAT WEIGHS ANYTHING ELSE. I 
22 MEAN, THAT'S COMMENDABLE, BUT IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT THAT 
23 MAKES MY DECISION HE WINS BECAUSE THAT'S A COMMENDABLE 
24 POSITION. SO CONVINCE ME. THAT'S WHAT WE ARE HERE FOR. 
25 MR. EDDINGTON: ALL RIGHT. I UNDERSTAND THE 
1 MR. EDDINGTON: WHAT IS REQUIRED BY STATUTE, AND 
2 YOU DON'T HAVE TO COMPLY WITH 2 (A). (I), IF I CAN REFER 
3 THE COURT DOWN TO 78-34-14 SUBPARAGRAPH FOUR. IF THERE'S 
4 NOW SHOWING THAT AN UNMARRIED BIOLOGICAL FATHER HAS 
5 CONSENTED TO OR WAIVED HIS RIGHTS REGARDING A PROPOSED 
6 ADOPTION, THE PETITIONER SHALL FILE WITH THE COURT A 
7 CERTIFICATE FROM THE STATE REGISTER OF VITAL STATISTICS 
8 WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH STATING THAT A DILIGENT 
9 SEARCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THE REGISTRY OF NOTICE FROM AN 
10 UNMARRIED BIOLOGICAL FATHER DESCRIBED IN SECTION 2 (B) (1) 
11 OR 2 (B) (2). AND THAT NO FILING HAS BEEN FOUND PERTAINING 
12 TO THE FATHER OF THE CHILD. THAT IS ALL THAT IS REQUIRED TO 
13 CUT HIM OFF. 
14 THE COURT: FOR WHICH SITUATION. 
15 MR. EDDINGTON: REGARDLESS OF THE AGE OF THE CHILD. 
16 THE COURT: WHY WASN'T IT ARGUED AT THE BEGINNING 
L7 OF THIS CASE OR THIS SUBPARAGRAPH FOUR EVER DISCUSSED. I 
L8 HAVE NEVER HEARD THAT FROM YOU DISCUSSED TODAY THAT THAT'S 
L9 WHAT YOU ARE GOING UNDER. WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT 2 (A) 
10 AND 2 (B) . OR I SURE HAVE THROUGH THE ENTIRE THING. AND IF 
21 FOUR IS THE THING THAT SAYS NOTWITHSTANDING 2 (A) AND 2(B) 
>2 THEN WHY DO WE HAVE A 2 (A) AND 2 (B), IF FOUR APPLIES TO 
>3 EVERYTHING. 
>4 MR. EDDINGTON: WELL, MY POINT IS IT DOESN'T MATTER 
>5 THE AGE OF THE CHILD IF A FIVE YEAR OLD -- AND MANY OF THESE 
